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NOTES.
-LADi iTY To MINOR WHO PRocUREs EMPLOYNEGLiGENE
MENT BY MISREPRESENTING His AGE.-On the sixth day of July,

igIo, in the case of St. Louis S. F. R. R. v. Brantley'; the Supreme
Court of Alabama decided, that a railroad, whose negligence caused
a minor employee injury, cannot escape its liability from the mere
fact, that the minor, contrary to the company's age regulations,
secured employment with the said road by misrepresenting his age.
The minor in this case for the purpose of securing employment,
falsely represerited himself to be of age, and thereby secured employment, in violation of the company's regulation, which prohibited the -employment of minors. Before he reached majority,
he was injured by the negligence of the company, which he sued for
damages. It is of interest to note that the dissenting Judge delivered the opinion for the court by devoting several pages to his
own dissenting views and only some twenty words to the opinion of
the majority.
153 So. 305 (Igo).

(178)
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To decide the question, it must. be determined in what relation
the minor stood to the company .at the time of the injury and what
duty the company -owed to him.
Judge Sayre in his dissenting opinion presents a summary of
one side of this question upon which the higher courts have
reached opposite conclusions. This dissenting view he based upon a
similar case of N. & W. R. R. v. Bondurrant 2 which in turn is
based upon Fitzmaurice v. R. R.8 His contention is, First: "It
would be a hard measure to hold a company responsible on the one
hand for failing to prescribe rules and on the other to refuse to
protect it from the the consequences of the violation of. reasonable
and proper rules, adopted and promulgated in discharge of the
duty imposed by law."- Second: That the minor would never
have been in the company's employ and consequently never hurt but
for his "own fraud in securing his employment. Third: That there
is a strong analogy between the case of Fitzmaurice v. R. R.B, where
a passenger secured a cheaper rate by fraudulently stating his age
and the present case where the minor gains employment by fraud
as to his age. In the former case the contract was held to be void,
and the passenger a trespasser, who was entitled to compensation
only in case the company's negligence was so gross that it amounted
to wilful injury. He applies the same rule to the case of the employee as to the case of the passenger because the only relation
existing between the minor and the company was induced by a material fraud, which he thinks rendered the contract void; therefore
Judge Sayre would relieve the company of all liability..
The majority of the court decided, that fraud in'a case of this
kind does not affect the minor's claim for compensation, unless his
immaturity immediately contributed to the accident. .The justice of
such a decision cannot be doubted for First: The company should
be protected from the consequences of the violation of its rules and
such protection is afforded the company, for the law allows it to sue
the minor in an action for deceit, or it may set off any damages due
to said deceit, in an action for wages, brought against it by the
minor. The rule, however, suggested by Judge Sayre would not
only protect the company from any violation of its rules but would
free it from all liability for injuries caused solely by the company's
own negligence and in no way by the minor's misstatements or immaturity. Second: While it is true the minor would never have
been injured had he not entered the company's employ, still no injuries would have resulted but for the company's negligence. This
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury which
was in no way attributable to the minor's misrepresentations or his
youth. Third: There may be a slight analogy between the case of
the fraudulent passenger as in Fitzmaurice v. R. R. and the case of
the minor. However, the former case is incorrect in holding the
' 59 S. F. 10gi (Va. io).
192 Mass. I5g.
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contract void and should have no bearing on the latter decision. The
contract in both cases was not void but voidable. It was voidable,
because the relation of master and servant existed by virtue of one
party performing valuable services, which were accepted and paid
for by the other.4 The company could terminate the contract when
the deception was discovered, but until one party or the other put an
end to the relation, it would continue to exist. It is true the minor
falsely stated his age, but a false statement to any other material
matter would have had the same effect upon the contract and relation created between the minor -and the company. The company
might fixt the age limit at tweny-five years, and if so, a misssatement
by a man of twenty-one years, regarding his age, would not make
him a trespasser and wrongdoer on the properties of the company.
If marriage were a requiement, a misstatement by an applicant
for employment, that he was married when in reality he was
single, would not render him a trespasser. The case is the same with
a railroad as any corporation or person. 5 A farmer might state that
he would'employ no one under twenty-one, yet a farmhand who
gained employment by falsely stating he was over twenty-one would
not be a trespasser on the farmer's lands. Judge Sayre distinctly
says the contract is void, and yet admits that had the minor continued in the employ of the company until after he had reached the
age of twefity-one, he would no longer have been a trespasser, and
by this admission he shows the fallacy of his entire argument, for the minor by continuing in the employment of the company after his majority, nevertheless is still working under the
same contract that he obtained before his majority by his misrepresentations. This' same contract exists both before and after his
majority and is voidable at the option of the company but not void,
for the only possible difference which can be created by 'his arrival at majority is that no injury could thereafter result to the
company from his deception.
It would therefore appear that the court was correct in holding
that a minor who obtained employment by.misstating his age, in
violation of the rules formulated by his employer and was subsequently injured by his employer's negligence, either before or after
reaching majority, is entitled to compensation if the said negligence
was the direct and proximate cause of the injury and his own immaturity in no way contributed to the injury.

C.S.H.

contingent, uncertain,
UNCERTAIN DAMAGES.-Speculative,
conjectural, remote damages are terms loosely used to cover what
may fairly be said to be really two questions. As the rule is different in each of these, the ambiguity is unfortunate. There would
' Luper v. A. T. S. Fe R. 1L, 81 Kans. 585.
OR. R.v. Baldwin, i9Ohio C. C. 338.
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be less apparent confusion in- the cases if a terminology were used
which distinguished between the two.
Speculative damages as a problem comprises the great middle
ground between two well-defined limits. At the one extremity we
have the cases where no damage has accrued whatsoever. At the
other are those cases where there is no doubt of the existence of
injury and the amount of the -damages is quite certain, perhaps
liquidated in advance, but at least capable of being ascertained by a
merely- mathematical process or by the application of definite standards. Between. these two extremes is the field of uncertainty
shading gradually from the one limit to the other. However, an analysis of the decisions shows them to be resolvable into two definite
classes. For the uncertainty of damages may be of two kinds,uncertainty as to the value of the benefit or gain that, it is claimed,
would have been realized but for the tortious act or breach.of contract charged against the defendant; and uncertainty whether any
such gain or benefit would be derived at all. It might be argued that
these are one and the same thing. Of course absence of damage
is a definite, namely, zero quantity of damage. However, there is
a sufficient difference for the-distinction to be made between a variability in plus amounts of damage and an uncertainty between plus
and zero damage.
That some damage has accrued in a given case may be certain,
and yet a valuation of it in terms of money impossible. When-this
impossibility is found by closer scrutiny to have been only apparent,
and the damage to be computable by investigation of market values,
cost of transportation, price of labor and the like, then we have a
case of ascertainable damages closely approaching the limit where
they are absolutely demonstrated.' Such a case is really not within
the realm of speculative damage. But there are many cases where
the existence of some damage is apparent, but where its amount
cannot be reduced to a certainty even by the exercise of careful investigation and mathematical computation. Where a variety of ways
of computing it are offered, the court will adopt the mode which
is the 'iiore definite and certain though it may be at the same time
admittedly the less adequate.2 So, rather than that the jury should
guess at the possible profits that might have been made with money
or goods or land, the court will allow a compensation for the use of
it during the period, for example, interest, hire and rent, which are
averages that have been found by extended observation.' In these
&
- dependable in amount upon circumcases, loss of profits although
stances is reasonably certain, because the contingencies in the case
do not go so far as to render uncertain the possibility of some profit.
So in the case of an established business of non-precarious character,
the chances being that it will go on as before, past profits may be
adduced as evidence for the purpose of allowing the jury to-form
Th.e Mayor of Brooklyn (1845), 7 Hill 62.
Griffin v. Colver (1858), 16 N. Y. 489.

£ Mastertofn'v.
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an approximation of future profits, as some courts have put it, or
of the present worth of the future expectation, as others would have
it'.
When the contingencies present in a case are so increased and extend the limits of variability so far that there may be no loss at all,
then there ii the second kind of uncertainty, true contingent damages, where no recovery is allowed. For the question on the whole
is how great and how many are the contingencies. The cases of
crops allow recovery according to two different rules, because in
some cases so many of the contingencies have been eliminated that
uncertainty remains merely as to the amount of loss. A crop is
grown of an inferior quality because of the defendant's breach.
There the contingencies of the fertility of the land, of weather and
season have been disposed of, the crop having been brought to
maturity.
5

In a recent English case8 , the contingencies upon which the
alleged loss of profits depended were carefully enumerated. It was
an action for the breach of a contract for the service of a celebrated
stallion. Although the plaintiff could show the actual profits made
on foals previously begotten of that sire, his recovery was nevertheless limited to nominal damages. While it was proven that the plaintiff's mare had been served by a less celebrated sire, there seems to
have been in the case no evidence that she had foaled to him a healthy
foal. If this had been shown the contingencies of the fertility or nonfertility of the mare would have been eliminated, and the case would
have been in line with the crop cases above-mentioned. However,
since it appeared absolutely uncertain whether there would have
been a colt born of the union contracted for, the court correctly held
that the case was not one of an "estimate of damages based on
probabilities" but a "claim for -damages of a totally problematical
character."
In so far as it is based on the idea of contingencies, in line

with the cases of the chance of winning a prize,7 the decision is satisfactory. Less convincing is the applicability of passages quoted
from Mayne on Damages.8 That passage which would apportion the

defendant's liability to the benefit he is to receive from the performance of the contract, is limited in application to the normal sale of

commodities and is at best doubtful. Nor is there greater merit in
the other suggeston, at least where it is obvious as here that the entire

object of the contract, to obtain a profit cut of the transaction, must
'Allison v. Chandler (863), ii Mich. _w.
"Goodhart v. IL 1. (i896), i77 Pa. 1.
Compare Wolcott v. Mount (873),

36 N. J. L. 262, with Chicago v.

Huenerbein (i877), 85 Ill. 594.
s Sapwell v. Bass (IgIO), 2 K. B. 486.
'Erle, J. (Patteson, J, contra), in Watson v. Ambergate, etc., Ry., 15
Jur. 448. See accord Adams Express Co. v. Egbert (i86o), 36 Pa. 36o.

' Mayne on Damages, 8th Ed., p. :i and p. 70.
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have been equally within the defendant's contemplation as within the
plaintiff's. The problem is really a more elemental one than any
application of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. It rather concerns
the fundamental burden placed upon the plaintiff of proving damage
which is precedent to his right of recovery of more than nominal
damages.
S.L.H.

PARTNERSHIP-RIGHTS OF CREDITORS IN SEPARATE PROPERTY
USED AS PROPERTY OF A PARTNERSHIP BY HOLDING OUT.-A discussion of this question is suggested by a case recently decided by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Johnson v. Williams, et
al.1 Should the firm creditors have a priority in the property used
as firm property is the issue presented. This involves the application of the rule finally settled in England by Lord Eldon, that the
joint fund should first be distributed among the joint creditors, the
separate property first among the separate creditors, each class having a right in any surplus of the other.
Some courts have
decided it in the negative, others in the affirmative. A Massachusetts decision, Broadway National Bank v. Wood, 2 is illustrative of
the former, and a Wisconsin case, Thayer v. Humphrey, 3 of the
latter. We will consider the argument for each separately.
The reasons for denying a priority to firm creditors in separate
property used as firm property by an.ostensible firm may be briefly
stated as follows: This priority exists only by virtue of the equity
existing between partners, inter se. That is, each partner has a right
to insist that firm assets shall be used to pay firm debts. This arises
from the agreement of partnership. Parsons,4 in his work on partnership denies this and insists that it arises from the separate liability
incurred as a result of being a partner. The cases do not bear him
out in this view, and we can dismiss it without further notice. In
the case of an ostensible partnership there is no agreement, and hence
nothing out of which an equity can flow. The firm creditors have
no claim to priority of their own strength, and if they have no derivative claim for want of a partner's equity, they can have no priority.
There are no cases which attack this reasoning. Its strength lies in
its simplicity. One other point is taken up, estoppel. The Virginia
court says, while the person held out is estopped to deny his liability
to creditors as a partner, between the partners themselves there is
no such estoppel. To quote the language of Judge Buchanan, "There
can be no equitable estoppel between parties where neither has been
9 Ex. 341.
168 S. F. 410 (Va. i91o).
2 165 Mass. 312 (I896).
391 Wis. 276 (1895).
"Parsons, Jas., on Partnership (2nd edition 1899), §io9, at page 511.
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misled by the conduct of the other. To hold, as some courts do, that
they or either of the members of the ostensible partnership are
estopped to deny that the property in the possession and use of the
ostensible firm is partnership property, is to ignore, as it seems to
us, the principles upon which the doctrine of equitable estoppel is
based and to declare equities between the ostensible partners which
have no existence in fact."
The cases which favor a priority have not the niceties of reasoning exhibited by the other cases. The courts seem to have decided on
abstract justice and then seized on the doctrine of equitable estoppel
to substantiate their views. In New York, 5 where the question
seems to have been first presented, the court expressly admitted that
no right to priority could be derived through the nominal partners.
The rights of the attaching creditors must rest upon the legal inability of the separate owner, who allowed the ostensible firm to use
the property as firm assets, to deny that the firm creditors could not
assert it was firm property. The soundness of this doctrine depends
on the presence of all the elements of an equitable estoppel. Bigelow,8 in his treatise says in order to constitute an estoppel by conduct there must be (i) a false representation or a concealment of
material fact; (2) the representation must have been made with
knowledge of the facts; (3) the party to whom it was made must
have been ignorant actually and permissibly of the truth of the
matter; (4) it must have been made with the intention that the
other party should act upon it; (5) the other party must have been
induced to act upon it. These requirements are satisfied with the
possible exception of the fourth. Intention is a difficult thing to get
at, but on the theory that a man must intend the natural and probable
consequences of his act, we can say the intention was present.
A difficulty arises when we consider who is bound by the estoppel. As Hillman v. Moore,7 points out, in Kelly v. Scott, supra,the
contest was between the assignee of the separate owner and the firm
creditors, and an estoppel is binding upon the parties and their
privies; but when separate creditors enter the dispute as is usual,
how can you bind them? Probably the leading case advocating an
estoppel is Thayer v. Humphrey," mentioned above. Marshall, J.,
in his opinion says the estoppel should exist "to prevent fraud
and promote justice between man and man in the administration of
human affairs." To show what ought to be the law is the law, he
cites two English decisions: In re Rowland and Crankshaw, 9 and ex
parte Hayman." These cases apparently support this view. Burdick," in his works on partnership contends, that they are decided
5Kelly v. Scott, 49 N. Y. Appeals 595 (1872).
'Bigelow on Estoppel (4th edition 1886), ch. 18, at page 552.
'3 Tenn. Ch.454 (i877).
891 Wis. 276 (i895).

'L. R. x Ch. App.

421 (i8

).

18 Ch. Div. I (1878).
"Burdick on Partnership (2nd Ed.) ph. 2, p. 76.
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under an English statute, creating the doctrine of reputed ownership. This is somewhat doubtful since one case expressly denies
that the decision has anything to do with reputed ownership, and the
other case insists that the foundation of the judgment was really the
doctrine in question. There is no attempt to discredit the objection
of Hillman v. Moore, supra, that the estoppel cannot bind the separate creditors. Furthermore, it is asserted that the ostensible member of such partnership can avail himself of the estoppel. The
argument in the principal case shows the fallacy of that by pointing
out; that he has not been misled and there is no ground for an
estoppel.
The doctrine denying priority, which, as we have pointed out,
is based on better reasoning, has met with more general approval
in this country. The courts in Pennsylvania have expressly approved
of it in Scull's Appeal, 12 and Bixler v. Kresge.18 The question of
estoppel is not taken up in these cases, so there is no ruling on that
point. In Scull's Appeal the court expresses a doubt as to whether
there was any holding out. If there was none, the case is useless
for our purposes. As before noted, Massachusetts and Tennessee
take this view. Virginia is the most recent acquisition. On the
other hand the Wisconsin view of Thayer v. Humphrey, supra, has
been followed in Michigan in the case of Van Kleeck v. McCabe."4
E. S. McK.

1II5 Pa. 141 (1886).
i69 Pa. 4o5 (895).
1"87 Mich. 599 (i8gi).

